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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, viral videos and commentaries have shed
light on a long-existing but previously under-recorded problem —
frivolous race-based police calls. For example, in Philadelphia, police
arrested two Black men, Donte Robinson and Rashon Nelson, in a
Starbucks after a White manager called 911 because the men did not
order anything immediately upon entering the establishment.1 In
Oakland, a White woman called the police on a Black family
barbecuing.2 In a different incident in San Francisco, a White woman
called the police on a Black mother and her eight-year-old child
because the two were selling water outside, apparently without a
permit.3 Another White woman physically assaulted a fifteen-yearold Black boy and threatened to call the police on him at a local pool
in South Carolina.4
In addition to these alarming events, a White student called the
police on a Black Yale student, Lolade Siyonbola, for sleeping in a
Yale University common room.5 A DoubleTree Hotel in Portland
decided to fire two White workers who called the police on Jermaine
1. Hayley Miller, Black Men Arrested at Starbucks Said They Were There For 2
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
19,
2018),
Before
911
Call,
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/black-men-speak-out-starbucksarrest_us_5ad8809fe4b0e4d0715dc393 [https://perma.cc/WS84-LDZC].
2. Christina Zhao, ‘BBQ Becky,’ White Woman Who Called Cops on Black
BBQ, 911 Tapes Released: ‘I’m Really Scared! Come Quick!’, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 4,
2018), www.newsweek.com/bbq-becky-white-woman-who-called-cops-black-bbq-911audio-released-im-really-1103057 [https://perma.cc/3GT8-TBKG].
3. Doreen St. Felix, The Summer of Coupon Carl, Permit Patty, and the Videos
That Turn White Privilege into Mockable Memes, NEW YORKER (July 21, 2018),
www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-summer-of-coupon-carl-permit-pattyand-the-videos-that-turn-cop-callers-into-mockable-memes [https://perma.cc/4GU967GF].
4. Jessica McBride, Stephanie Sebby-Strempel, ‘Pool Patrol Paula’: 5 Fast Facts
You Need to Know, HEAVY (July 3, 2018), heavy.com/news/2018/06/stephanie-sebbystrempel/ [https://perma.cc/MA5G-2XMC].
5. Brandon Griggs, A Black Yale Graduate Student Took a Nap in Her Dorm’s
Common Room. So a White Student Called Police, CNN (May 12, 2018),
www.cnn.com/2018/05/09/us/yale-student-napping-black-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2EA6-XF2F].
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Massey, a Black man who was a guest at the hotel.6 And, more
recently, a White woman called the police on a Black man, Devin
Myers, claiming that he looked at her “suspiciously.”7 In a more
proximate incident in New York City, a White woman called the
police on Jesse Hamilton, a Democratic state senator campaigning in
Brooklyn.8 Explaining the reason for her call, the woman stated — “I
support Trump, and I see the difference between Democrat and
Republican — and I see the difference between you and Trump . . .
.”9 She then censured Hamilton for giving out pamphlets and
“fighting back” against Trump.10
These occurrences, which this Note terms “frivolous race-based
police calls” (FRBPCs), have a long history within the United States,
and comport with Katheryn Russell-Brown’s notion of the “racial
hoax.”11 Racial hoaxes occur “[w]hen someone fabricates a crime
and blames it on another person because of his race or when an actual
crime has been committed and the perpetrator falsely blames
someone because of his race.”12 Russell-Brown argues that Whiteon-Black racial hoaxes are based on White people’s “imaginary”
inventions of Black people.13 She notes that “[h]oax perpetrators are
most frequently charged with filing a false police report,” but that
“the number of racial hoaxes suggests that false police report statutes
do not operate as effective deterrents.”14
Russell-Brown locates the genesis of racial hoaxes within the
external and internal images that the media creates through a

6. Soo Youn, DoubleTree Portland Hotel Fires 2 Workers for Calling Police on
Black Hotel Guest, ABC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2018), abcnews.go.com/US/doubletree-

portland-hotel-fires-workers-calling-police-black/story?id=60066428
[https://perma.cc/E6MG-SAR9].
7. Marina Pitofsky, White Woman Calls Police on Black Man Looking for
Parking, Says He Looked ‘Suspiciously’ at Her, HILL (Aug. 16, 2019),
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/457673-white-woman-calls-policeon-black-man-looking-for-parking-says [https://perma.cc/GE2N-EHRX].
8. Dominique Mosbergen, NY Lawmaker Wants to Make Calling Cops on
Innocent Black People a Hate Crime, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2018),
www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/911-discrimination-law-jesse-hamilton-newyork_us_5b796dbfe4b0a5b1febc2632 [https://perma.cc/4XYB-3H6G].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See generally KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL
HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER
MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998) [hereinafter RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME].
12. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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fictionalized reality about Black people.15 She points out that, on the
one hand, “Blacks are regularly portrayed as lawyers, doctors, nurses,
police officers, and best friends.”16 On the other hand, several trends
have emerged other trends that “revert to crude one-dimensional
images of Blackness.”17 Russell-Brown notes — as images of
fictionalized Black deviancy — talk shows that portray Black people
as amoral buffoons; sitcoms that portray the “comical relief”
caricature of Black manhood; “reality” police television programs
that showcase Black criminals; and the news.18 Russell-Brown
analyzes more than 100 racial-hoax cases beginning in 1987,
identifying
stark
disparities
among
hoax
perpetrators.19
Approximately two-thirds of hoax perpetrators are White, she
writes.20 She also points out that “[p]eople carry out racial hoaxes for
all sorts of reasons — serious, mundane, or even silly.”21 For this
Note’s purposes, it is important to take note of the racial disparities
that Russell-Brown highlights and to limit the scope of analysis to
White-on-Black FRBPCs.
In line with Russell-Brown’s analysis, this Note takes seriously the
cultural and social mechanisms by which Blackness is converted into a
symbol of deviance and criminality. This Note also considers the
structural legal mechanisms by which Black people are policed as
deviant and criminal. However, this Note departs from RussellBrown by positing that, unlike racial hoaxes, frivolous race-based
police calls do not always require: (1) fabricating a crime; or (2)
falsely blaming an actual crime on someone else because of the
person’s race.22 Instead, this Note asserts that FRBPCs occur simply
when a person calls the police on an individual because of that
individual’s real or perceived racial identity, when said individual is
engaged in quotidian activities — everyday tasks such as sleeping,

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.

Katheryn Russell-Brown, As Racial Hoaxes Go, Jussie Smollett’s Case Is a
Strange One, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2019) [hereinafter Russell-Brown, As Racial
Hoaxes Go], https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/jussie-smollett-andlong-history-racial-hoaxes/583498/ [https://perma.cc/9WPW-RRCK].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME, supra note 11, at 70.
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walking, and playing in the park — that, under most circumstances,
would not be considered criminal.23
It is also worth highlighting that this Note’s focus is distinct from
the recent, and now-infamous, alleged racial-hoax incident involving
Hollywood celebrity Jussie Smollett.24 The Smollett incident is
different because, although Smollett was accused of perpetrating a
Black-on-White hoax,25 his initial allegations referred to general,
unidentified White people. White-on-Black frivolous race-based
police calls, by contrast, aim to regulate the lives of specific,
individual Black people. White-on-Black FRBPCs are particularly
dangerous because they are rooted in acts of flagrant and subtle

23. See, e.g., Erin E. Evans & The Associated Press, Black Attorney Says Deputy
Thought He Was a Suspect and Detained Him at Court, NBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2019),

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/black-attorney-says-deputy-detained-himcourt-because-he-thought-n988111 [https://perma.cc/E86U-75CN] (reporting that a
Maryland Sheriff’s Deputy detained a Black lawyer in County Courthouse because
the deputy thought the lawyer was a suspect). Although this incident does not involve
a private citizen making a frivolous race-based call, it is important to note that such
incidents are equally reprehensible and reinscribe the notion that Black people are
criminal. Id.
24. See Dorany Pineda, A Timeline of How the Jussie Smollett Case Unfolded,
L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-jussiesmollett-timeline-of-events-20190221-story.html
[https://perma.cc/U3DA-G9YY]
(noting that Jussie Smollett was arrested by police after allegedly faking a hate crime
against himself in Chicago). Smollett is biracial, gay, and a prominent actor, who until
recently, was known for his activism and justice work. Id. The alleged attack on
Smollett initially gained widespread media attention after he claimed that two people
yelling racial and homophobic slurs approached him as he was walking in Chicago’s
Streeterville neighborhood at 2 a.m. Id. Smollett claimed that the men hit him,
poured an unknown chemical substance on him and wrapped a rope around his neck.
Id. He further claimed that the attackers referred to “MAGA country” during the
attack, an apparent invocation of Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again”
campaign slogan. Id.
25. John Blake, Jussie Smollet’s Race Card Is about to Be Declined, CNN (Feb.
24, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/24/us/smollett-race-blake-analysis/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3369-7SL7] (comparing Jussie’s performance of Blackness to the
likes of O.J. Simpson and other celebrities). Blake writes, “Simpson was able to rally
support for himself during and after his murder trial by ‘deciding to become a black
man.’” Id. He adds:
Smollett . . . claimed [to be the] victim of white racism and gained initial
support from black leaders. But in a new era where Donald Trump is in the
Oval Office, Bill Cosby is in jail and R&B singer R. Kelly is headed to court,
Smollett may soon learn that the rules have changed for black celebrities
caught in deep legal trouble.
Id. (citing Avis Thomas-Lester, O.J.? Oh, Brother! I Can’t Believe Black Folks Are
Still
Falling
for
This
Con,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
1,
1996),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1996/09/01/oj-oh-brother-i-cantbelieve-black-folks-are-still-falling-for-his-con/be49d1a7-ec3a-439e-a27f155faf8204fe/ [https://perma.cc/S962-P5BM]).
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exclusion that ultimately relegate Black individuals to geographical
confinement.
This Note posits that White supremacy and anti-Blackness function
both as psycho-spiritual and structural evils. The term “structural”
refers to historical and contemporaneous legal mechanisms —
including statutes, ordinances, formal and informal policies, and
judicial decisions — that have caused legal harm and physical loss to
Black people by denying them access to full citizenship and humanity
under U.S. law. The term “psycho-spiritual” refers to a particular
type of theological harm that extends beyond the psychological
impacts of racial stigma cited by cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education.26 The term “psycho-spiritual” encompasses the spiritual
and psychological injury caused by exclusionary White theological
customs, culture, and spaces, which separately and cumulatively work
to deny Black people access to divinity.
In order to remediate the problem, the law must do more than
challenge legalized White space. It must challenge the theological
deification of White bodies. Examining the theological treatment of
Whiteness as sacred helps to illuminate why FRBPCs are so difficult
to address and how the deification of White bodies is embedded in
America’s moral and civic national identity.
A theological
examination also lays the groundwork for devising a civil action that
addresses the psycho-spiritual component of White supremacy and
anti-Blackness. Incorporating theological analysis more effectively
highlights the group-based injury that Black people experience as a
result of FRBPCs and can help to eradicate the imprisoning remnants
of White supremacy and anti-Blackness. Additionally, crafting a legal
remedy that recognizes the need for psycho-spiritual “repentance”27
affirms Black people’s humanity and their divinity, and works to
divest White people of “their subjugating control over non[W]hite
bodies.”28 In the event that such a law is not frequently enforced, its

26. See 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
27. 2 Corinthians 7:10–11 (New International Version) (“Godly sorrow brings
repentance that leads to salvation and leaves no regret, but worldly sorrow brings
death. See what this godly sorrow has produced in you: what earnestness, what
eagerness to clear yourselves, what indignation, what alarm, what longing, what
concern, what readiness to see justice done.”).
28. KELLY BROWN DOUGLAS, STAND YOUR GROUND: BLACK BODIES AND THE
JUSTICE OF GOD 69 (2015) (“By entering into the white space, and perhaps even
thriving in it, a free black body contests the very notion of white supremacy. The
ideology of white supremacy is maintained to the extent that white bodies continue
their subjugating control over nonwhite bodies. The moment that this controlling
relationship is subverted, the ideology of white supremacy is fractured.”).
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aspirational quality suffices as a source of empowerment for Black
people, and affirms their inherent value.
Part I of this Note will discuss the longstanding history of White
supremacy and anti-Blackness in the United States. Part II will
discuss the legal construction of White space as protected space. Part
III will discuss the theological construction of White bodies as
protected bodies. Part IV will examine the efficacy of current New
York State law governing false police reports and hate crimes. Part V
will propose a remedy that includes theological discourse and draws
on civil law principles, incorporating aspects of critical legal theory.
The Note will emphasize the signaling power of the law, the need for
normative policy, and the significance of White repentance and
contrition. Furthermore, the Note asserts that viewing the law as
aspirational29 can serve public education purposes, address explicit
and implicit biases, and has the potential to remedy omitted contexts
and selective enforcement.
I. ANTI-BLACKNESS AND WHITE SUPREMACY AS CONTEXT
Part I focuses on anti-Blackness and White supremacy in the
United States. Section I.A provides meaningful definitions of the two
terms. Section I.B provides helpful anecdotes of racialized exclusion
that resulted in Black geographical confinement.
A. Definitions
In order to fully understand the meaning of frivolous race-based
police calls — which often occur in spaces that are not exclusively
White, but are fertile ground for White dominance — it is necessary
to contextualize the calls within a larger system of White supremacy
and anti-Blackness. Here, White supremacy refers to:
[Not] the self-conscious racism of [W]hite supremacist hate
groups[] . . . [but] instead to a political, economic and cultural system
in which [W]hites overwhelmingly control power and material
resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of [W]hite superiority
and entitlement are widespread, and relations of White dominance
and non-White subordination are daily reenacted across a broad
array of institutions and social settings.30

29. See generally Mauricio Garcia-Villegas, Law as Hope: Constitutions, Courts,
and Social Change in Latin America, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 133 (2004) (discussing
aspirational constitutionalism in Latin America).
30. Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil
Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129 (1989).
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Anti-Blackness here refers to the definition offered by Charlene
Curruthers, founding National Director of Black Youth Project 100,31
who defines anti-Blackness as “a system of beliefs and practices that
destroy, erode, and dictate the humanity of Black people.”32 The
Note uses the terms “White supremacy” and “anti-Blackness” to
indicate the way that the two phenomena have combined historically
and contemporaneously to effectuate racial subordination and
hierarchy.33
B. Anecdotes: Exclusion Resulting in Black Geographical
Confinement
Rightly understood, both White supremacy and anti-Blackness
have always had a geographical dimension, working to the detriment
and degradation of Black people. Early on in her career, Ida B. Wells
had a personal encounter with anti-Blackness’s and White
supremacy’s geographical component. In 1883, Wells was forcibly
removed from a train car because she refused to sit in the smoking car
with other Blacks on her way to visit family in Woodstock.34 Dr.
Emilie Townes writes that Wells hired a lawyer and sued the railroad
for damages in 1884.35 Although Wells was initially awarded damages
by a state court, the Supreme Court ultimately overturned the verdict,
ostensibly because Wells’s suit was not made in “good faith.”36
Wells’s forcible ejection exemplifies anti-Black geographical
confinement in its most visible form because she was physically
removed from what was legally designated as a White space.
W. E. B. Du Bois articulates a different iteration of geographical
confinement in The Souls of Black Folk, writing, “[b]etween me and

31. Full
Biography,
CHARLENE
CARRUTHERS
(2017),
https://www.charlenecarruthers.com/about [https://perma.cc/U97A-HXQW].
32. CHARLENE A. CARRUTHERS, UNAPOLOGETIC: A BLACK, QUEER, AND
FEMINIST MANDATE FOR RADICAL MOVEMENTS x (2018).
33. Although this Note focuses on frivolous race-based police calls that are
committed against Black people, it recognizes that White supremacy results in other
forms of discrimination, violence, exclusion, and confinement directed toward people
of color who share common, immutable characteristics. Furthermore, this Note
recognizes and disavows all forms of discrimination, violence, exclusion, and
confinement that are committed because of a person’s ethnic background, sexual
orientation, gender identity, religion, color, nationality, ancestry, or language. See
Tanya K. Hernandez, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the Prosecution of
‘Racially Motivated Violence’, 99 YALE L. J. 845, 846 n.6 (1990).
34. EMILIE M. TOWNES, WOMANIST JUSTICE, WOMANIST HOPE 8 (1993).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 9 (citing DOROTHY STERLING, BLACK FOREMOTHERS: THREE LIVES 76–
77 (1979)).
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the other world there is ever an unasked question: . . . how does it feel
to be a problem?”37 According to Du Bois, “the problem of the
twentieth century [was] the problem of the color line,”38 which
functioned as a literal and figurative marker of the boundaries and
limits of Black existence. Du Bois reflects on his first encounter with
anti-Black confinement, when a little White girl would not accept a
card from him simply because he was Black.39 He writes, “[t]hen it
dawned upon me with a certain sadness that I was different from the
others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and longing, but shut out
from their world by a vast veil.”40 The “shutting out” to which Du
Bois refers is not an anomalous experience but is rather the common
result of anti-Black exclusion framed as subtle rejection.
Malcolm X described similar experiences of anti-Black
geographical confinement when he encountered White administrators
at his reform school in Michigan in the late 1930s. X states, “[t]hey all
liked my attitude . . . . They would talk about anything and everything
with me standing right there hearing them, the same way people
would talk freely in front of a pet canary. They would talk about me,
or bout ‘niggers,’ as though I wasn’t there . . . .”41 Although X is
permitted to physically inhabit the same space as White people, he is
treated as if he was not actually present.
Wells’s, Du Bois’s, and X’s personal stories highlight the
adaptability42 of anti-Blackness and White supremacy as tools of
oppression that survive by way of “preservation through
transformation.”43 Both tools ultimately further racial subordination
and enforce boundary demarcation. These three narratives provide
further insight into how subtle exclusion works in tandem with

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

W. E. B. DU BOIS, The Souls of Black Folk, in WRITINGS 363 (1986).

Id. at 372.
Id. at 364.
Id.

MALCOLM X & ALEX HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X: AS
TOLD TO ALEX HALEY 30–31 (2d ed., 1999) (1965).
42. See generally Elise Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235
(2016) [hereinafter Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination] Boddie criticizes the
assumption in constitutional law that racial discrimination is siloed, static, and time
limited. Id. Boddie argues instead that “discrimination is systemic, dynamic, and
intergenerational due to its adaptive nature.” Id. Boddie further contends that
discrimination adapts to law and to social norms that prohibit intentional
discrimination. Id.; see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:
The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113
(1997).
43. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 21 (2010).
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explicit line-drawing in order to reinforce the invisible “color line”44
in geographical terms. These anecdotes are helpful for excavating the
historical and contemporary function of anti-Blackness and White
supremacy in regulating individual and collective Black life. They
demonstrate flagrant and tacit forms of exclusion that work to
geographically confine Black people. White-on-Black frivolous racebased police calls, this Note argues, are essentially new iterations of
these age-old problems.
II. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITE SPACE AS PROTECTED
SPACE
This Part examines the structural mechanisms of the law, including
statutes, ordinances, formal and informal policies, and judicial
decisions which are used to maintain White supremacy and create
White-only space. Section II.A discusses the early iterations of the
Slave Codes and the Black Codes. Section II.B discusses the Jim and
Jane Crow era. Finally, Section II.C analyzes the post-Jim and Jane
Crow legal and extra-legal mechanisms45 that work to maintain racebased boundary enforcement.
A. The Slave Codes and the Black Codes
White-on-Black FRBPCs occur, in part, because the law has
constructed White space as protected space.46 From 1619 to 1865, the
Slave Codes — a combination of criminal and procedural law —
“prescribed the social boundaries for slaves — where they could go,
what types of activities they could engage in, and what types of
contracts they could enter into.”47 The Slave Codes created a caste

44. DU BOIS, supra note 37, at 372.
45. Historical extra-legal mechanisms included lynching, intimidation, and Jim
Crow segregation. Modern extra-legal practices include blockbusting and predatory
lending. See Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation
Ordinances of 1910–1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 322 (1983) (documenting that, in
Baltimore, threats included claims of building code violations if one tried to integrate
neighborhoods, and violent actions by local populations). Power argues that local
governments effectively sanctioned such threats and actions by choosing not to police
them. Id.; see also NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., HOMEOWNERSHIP AND
WEALTH BUILDING IMPEDED: CONTINUING LENDING DISPARITIES FOR MINORITIES
AND EMERGING OBSTACLES FOR MIDDLE-INCOME AND FEMALE BORROWERS OF ALL
RACES (Apr.
2006),
https://ncrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/ncrc-oaprrac%20report%204-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH8M-4ZZG] (finding “persistent fair
lending disparities for minorities” in home loan data).
46. See generally Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707
(1993).
47. RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME, supra note 11, at 14–15.
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system under which Whites, Blacks, and Mulattoes were accorded
separate legal status and sanctions.48 Beginning in 1865, new laws,
called the Black Codes, gave newly freed slaves the right to marry and
to enter into contracts, but conversely imposed job licensing
requirements, criminalized activities such as gathering after dark, and
effectively granted legal exoneration to White supremacist groups
like the Ku Klux Klan.49 Under the Slave Codes and the Black
Codes, White supremacy had the full force of law.
B. Jim and Jane Crow
Later, in the Jim and Jane Crow era, anti-Blackness and White
supremacy reared their ugly heads in the form of strict segregation
laws that regulated Black private and public life and imposed “racial
etiquette” requirements that required Black subordination to White
authority at all times. In addition to using formal Jim and Jane Crow
laws to restrict Black living, White people also used private contracts
called restrictive covenants to prevent Blacks from buying homes in
White neighborhoods. First introduced in the 1920s, restrictive
covenants soon became the norm, and after World War II, many
suburban communities required all residential subdivisions to have
such covenants.50 One California covenant stated, “[n]o [N]egro,
[J]apanese or [C]hinese or any person of [A]frican or [M]ongolian
descent shall own or occupy any part of said premises.”51
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court opined that racially
restrictive covenants did not in and of themselves violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, declaring that the covenants were a creative
means by which to privatize acts of discrimination and circumvent the
constitution.52 At the time, the reality of restrictive covenants would
have been consonant with the Court’s holding in Plessy v. Ferguson,53
which established the constitutionality of “separate but equal” public
accommodations.54 The covenants would have also been consistent

48. Id.
49. Id. at 19–20.
50. See James Loewen, Was Your Town a Sundown Town?: How to Find out If
Your Community Intentionally Excluded African Americans, UU WORLD MAG.
(Feb. 18, 2008), https://www.uuworld.org/articles/was-your-town-sundown-town
[https://perma.cc/2J8X-U2UC].
51. Id.
52. 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
53. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544–52.
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with federal agency policy that permitted racial segregation. For
example, in the 1940s, the Federal Housing Act’s Underwriting
Manual “praised restrictive covenants as ‘the surest protection against
undesirable encroachment’ of ‘inharmonious racial groups.’”55
Remarkably, in a departure from the racial attitudes of the time, the
Court in Shelley found that, in granting judicial enforcement of
restrictive covenants, the state courts violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56
Despite the Court’s wisdom in Shelley, the covenants and other
legal and extralegal mechanisms57 cumulatively confined Blacks to
urban ghettos. Black families that attempted to escape the ghetto
were forced to deal with “Improvement Associations,” which were
founded to resist “the invasion of White residence districts by the
Negroes.”58 Ta-Nehisi Coates writes that the borders of the ghetto
were patrolled not just by government policy, but by the willingness
of individual White citizens to resort to violence.59 The
ghettoization60 of the city of Chicago, for example was not primarily
the result of poverty, nor of individual choice, but was instead “the
product of [W]hite hostility . . . .”61 As during Jim and Jane Crow,
White-on-Black frivolous race-based police calls, much like processes
of segregation and ghettoization, rely on White citizens’ continued
use of privatized force. Private uses of force are given legitimacy by
law when White citizens enlist the police to enforce racial boundaries,
and when the government actively participates in such boundarydrawing.62

55. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Trayvon Martin Was a Victim of Black on Black Crime,
(Sept.
16,
2013),
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/09/trayvon-martin-was-a-victim-ofblack-on-black-crime/279691/ [https://perma.cc/AFZ2-XDY8].
56. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 22–23.
57. Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New
Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 455 (2007).
58. Coates, supra note 55.
59. Id.
60. See Priya S. Gupta, Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal
History, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 187, 192 (2015). Depleted cities, the Foreclosure Crisis,
and racial disparities in housing are not the “natural” results of a free market, but
“inevitable results of a century’s worth of deliberate policy choices, all of them aimed
at inscribing a particular societal structure — the white nuclear family — into the
physical landscape of American housing.” Id. at 188.
61. Coates, supra note 55 (citing BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE,
REAL ESTATE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA (2009)).
62. See Gupta, supra note 60, at 194 (“The reframing of extensive government
regulation and resource expenditure as merely supporting (rather than creating) the
[housing] market has served . . . to obscure the huge role the government has always
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C. Post-Jim and Jane Crow
Post-Jim and Jane Crow, exclusionary zoning developed as a legal
method used to construct distinctive, all-White, spaces and to enforce
race-based boundaries. Moreover, judicial enforcement is one of the
primary modes of keeping the system of geographical imprisonment
alive. In one of the most infamous exclusionary zoning cases, Village
of Arlington Heights,63 the Court held that the Village’s denial of a
zoning request to create low-and-moderate income housing did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, in part
because the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation “ha[d]
no racial identity and [could not] be the direct target of the
petitioner’s alleged discrimination.”64 The Court conceded that the
Village’s zoning denial would likely have a disparate impact on Black
residents, but found that there was insufficient evidence to establish
racially discriminatory intent or purpose.65
In another case, City of Memphis v. Greene, Black residents filed
an action against the City of Memphis and various officials, alleging
that the City’s decision to close the north end of a street (West
Drive), which traversed a White residential community (Hein Park),
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.66 The plaintiffs also alleged that the erection of the
barrier violated their rights to access their property under a federal
civil rights statute67 and that the closure was “a badge of slavery”

played in exclusion in housing.”); see also Thomas J. Sugrue, The New American
Dream:
Renting,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Aug.
14,
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204409904574350432677038184
.html [https://perma.cc/Q6BH-43PK] (“It seemed that segregation was just the
natural working of the free market, the result of the sum of countless individual
choices about where to live. But the houses were single — and their residents white
— because of the invisible hand of government.”).
63. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977),
superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1972 (1965) (amended
1982), as recognized in Chapman v. Nicholson, 579 F. Supp. 1504, 1507 (N.D. Ala.
1984) (finding that “the Voting Rights Act and the legislative history surrounding its
passage suggest that Congress intended to allow a cause of action based on Section 2
of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973) without the requirement of a finding of purposeful or
intentional discrimination”).
64. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 263.
65. Id. at 265–71.
66. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 129 (1981).
67. See Greene, 451 U.S. at 102; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1972) (“All citizens of
the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.”).
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under the Thirteenth Amendment.68 The lower court held the street
closing invalid because it adversely affected the Black respondents’
ability to hold and enjoy their property. 69 The Supreme Court later
reversed on the grounds that the record did not support a finding of
“racial animus or an intent to discriminate on the basis of race.”70
As Arlington Heights and Greene show, legally constructed White
space as protected space is inherently tied to the idea of property.71
In Arlington Heights, the Court reinforced the notion that the
Village’s single-family housing restriction was not only permissible,
but was the most desirable form of residential arrangement.72
Furthermore, the Court completely dismissed the racial undertones
embedded in the Village’s claim that rezoning would cause a
measurable drop in property value. While the Village attributed its
fear of a decline in property value to structural incompatibility, its
argument implicitly suggested that allowing non-White and/or lowincome residents into the community would cause property
depreciation.
Given that the zoning denial disproportionately
affected Black people,73 the implication is that Black-inhabited
property is unmarketable and worthless, a commonly used racist
trope.74 In Greene, the Court relied on similarly faulty logic that
ignored the reality of racial segregation and the deployment of
harmful racial tropes.75 In both cases, the Court erroneously relied
on the faulty premise that anti-Blackness and White supremacy

68.
69.
70.
71.

Greene, 451 U.S. at 124.
Id. (citing Greene v. Memphis, 610 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1979)).
Id. at 135.
See generally Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994); see also DAVID M.P.

FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY & WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN
SUBURBAN AMERICAN 9 (2007) (discussing the “supposedly non-ideological market
considerations” and investment “protection” purportedly driving White people’s
desire to live in homogenous neighborhoods).
72. Gupta, supra note 60, at 238.
73. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254
(1977) (noting that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the “ultimate
effect” of the rezoning denial was racially discriminatory and that the denial would
disproportionately affect Blacks, particularly in view of the fact that the general
suburban area was marked by residential segregation).
74. See, e.g., Wilborn P. Nobles III, Politicians, Pundits, Others Defend
Baltimore, Elijah Cummings after Trump’s ‘Completely Unacceptable’ Tweets,
BALTIMORE SUN (July 27, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-poltrump-baltimore-reactions-20190727-rkn2npfghfgtdm4ikex77szjgm-story.html
[https://perma.cc/RZ8M-QZUA] (discussing Donald Trump’s statements calling
Baltimore “infested”).
75. Greene, 451 U.S. at 134–35, 144.
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require outward manifestations of intent.76 Rather than considering
the not-too-distant history of Jim and Jane Crow, the Court viewed
race in an ideological vacuum.77 Both cases reveal that White
property as real property78 is cherished, and that Black people are
thought to destroy such property merely by living in proximity to it.79
Cheryl Harris provides critical analysis about the relationship
between White identity and property in Whiteness as Property.80
Harris begins with an anecdote about her fair-skinned grandmother,
who was able to (tres)pass as White and work at a retail store in
Chicago.81 Harris writes that her grandmother “made herself
invisible, then visible again . . . ”82 and argues that “passing . . . is a
feature of race subordination in all societies structured on [W]hite
supremacy.”83 In addition to maintaining that passing for White
ensured her grandmother short-term economic returns and long-term
security,84 Harris explicitly states that “American law has recognized
a property interest in [W]hiteness.”85 Moreover, she contends that
Whiteness shares some of the central characteristics of property,
arguing that both “share . . . a conceptual nucleus . . . [the] right to
exclude.”86
After describing how Blacks were once themselves considered
property, Harris turns to examine modern theories of property. She
explains how Whiteness meets the functional criteria of property,87
stating that, although Whiteness is inalienable (meaning it cannot be
transferred), that fact “should not preclude the consideration of
76. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66; Greene, 451 U.S. at 135.
77. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66; Greene, 451 U.S. at 135.
78. “Real Property is the category of property that is permanent and that is
potentially subject to alienation or inheritance, the most common form of which is
the ownership of land or any interest in lands.” Real Property, WOLTERS KLUWER
BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION 2238 (2012).
79. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269 (“The impact of the Village's decision does
arguably bear more heavily on racial minorities.”); Greene, 451 U.S. at 127 (“The
residential interest in comparative tranquility is also unquestionably legitimate. That
interest provides support for zoning regulations, designed to protect a ‘quiet place
where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted . . . .’ and for the
accepted view that a man's home is his castle.”) (citing Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); Arlington County Board v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977)).
80. See Harris, supra note 46.
81. Id. at 1710.
82. Id. at 1711.
83. Id. at 1712.
84. Id. at 1713.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1714.
87. Id. at 1731.
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Whiteness as property.”88
She maintains that Whiteness is
functionally property because: (1) it is based on the right to use and
enjoyment (Whites use and enjoy Whiteness each time they take
advantage of White skin privilege);89 (2) it is based on reputation and
status property (calling a White person Black once constituted
defamation);90 and (3) it features the absolute right to exclude (there
are numerous cases where discriminatory policy is accepted as the
norm).91 Harris’s conception of Whiteness and White identity as
legally protected property is consistent with the holdings in Arlington
Heights and Greene. Because White identity itself is a kind of
property that White people need in order to protect themselves, any
and all space that White people occupy becomes bounded.
Angela Onwuachi-Willig’s Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness
underscores this point.92 Onwuachi-Willig maintains that the Emmett
Till and Trayvon Martin cases are similar because of “their shared
basis in policing the boundaries of [W]hiteness.”93 In both cases,
policing occurred in a variety of forms, including: (1) maintaining
White racial separation; (2) facilitating cross-class, White racial
solidarity; (3) articulating Blackness, and specifically Black maleness,
as a threat; and (4) regulating the presence and movement of Blacks
in what sociologist Elijah Anderson has defined as “the [W]hite
space.”94 In a similar fashion, White-on-Black FRBPCs are enacted
by private White citizens, but are premised on the underlying
assumption that all non-White people who pass and/or trespass on
White space must be excluded, punished, confined, or killed.
III. THE THEOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHITE BODIES
Part III examines the theological treatment of Whiteness and
explores how the deification of White bodies is embedded in the

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1733–34.
Id. at 1734.
Id. at 1736.
Id. at 1736; see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Policing the Boundaries of
Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from Emmett Till to Trayvon
Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113, 1125 n.52 (2017).
92. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 91, at 1113.
93. Id. at 1119.
94. Id. at 1119 n.24 (citing Elijah Anderson, The White Space, 1 SOC. RACE &

ETHNICITY 10, 10 (2015) (describing “the white space” in part as “overwhelmingly
white neighborhoods, restaurants, schools, universities, workplaces, churches and
other associations, courthouses, and cemeteries . . . that reinforce[d] a normative
sensibility in settings in which black people are . . . not expected, or marginalized
when present”)).
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United States’ moral and civic national identity. This theological
examination lays the groundwork for devising a civil remedy that
addresses the psycho-spiritual component of White supremacy and
anti-Blackness, highlighting the group-based injury that Black people
experience. Section III.A reckons with Whiteness wielded as
theological power. Section III.B confronts Whiteness used as sacred
identity.
A. Interrogating Whiteness as Theological Power
Much like the law constructs White identity and White space as
protected, theology and Christian doctrine construct White bodies as
sacred. Such constructions of the White body rely on Whiteness as a
kind of theological power. Reverend Dr. James Hal Cone articulated
the reality of White theological supremacy, arguing that White
theology is “an axiological perspective that contradicts the divine will
to liberate the poor and the downtrodden.”95 According to Cone,
White theology is “the predominant paradigm out of which both
unconverted [W]hites and acquiescing [B]lacks work . . . . It identifies
with the [W]hite community, seemingly placing God’s approval on
[W]hite oppression of [B]lacks.”96 Because of White people’s
domination in the development of Christian thought, Black
theologians are tasked with challenging White theology, which has
been, and continues to be, on the side of the strong and the powerful,
and against the weak and the oppressed.97
White theology reinforces White power because it uses images and
ideas to “dominate Christian religious life and the intellectual life of
theologians, reinforcing the ‘moral’ right of [W]hites to dominate
people of color economically [and] politically.”98 Although Black
theologians have consistently written about the harms of White
theology and have invented subversive theologies of their own,
evidence of White theological dominance is apparent in the twenty-

95. JAMES H. CONE, GOD OF THE OPPRESSED 84 (rev. ed., Orbis Books 1997)
(1975).
96. Marguerite L. Spencer, Subsidiarity and Environmental Law: Environmental
Racism and Black Theology: James H. Cone Instructs Us on Whiteness, 5 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 288, 299 (2008) (citing JAMES H. CONE, A BLACK THEOLOGY OF
LIBERATION 6 (20th anniversary ed.) (1996)).
97. HOWARD THURMAN, JESUS AND THE DISINHERITED 12–15 (rev. ed., Beacon
Press Books 1996) (1949).
98. Spencer, supra note 96, 300 (citing JAMES H. CONE, FOR MY PEOPLE: BLACK
THEOLOGY AND THE BLACK CHURCH, WHERE HAVE WE BEEN AND WHERE ARE WE
GOING? 64 (1984); JAMES H. CONE, RISKS OF FAITH: THE EMERGENCE OF A BLACK
THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION 130–31 (1999)).
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first century. For example, Kelly Brown Douglas recalls the
controversy that surrounded President Barrack Obama’s 2008
campaign when the Reverend Doctor Jeremiah Wright, Obama’s
pastor at the time, was publicly lambasted for preaching against
White supremacy and the mythical innocence of White America.99
She writes, “[d]uring that controversy the [B]lack church as well as
[B]lack theology came under attack. Both were essentially accused of
not being Christian mainly because they called into question the very
narrative of America’s exceptionalism.”100 The 2008 campaign
controversy revealed that White theology is centered on the belief
that White people have the unspoken right to determine what is good
and what is not; what is Christian and what is not.101 It also revealed
that White theology is centered on the belief that White power is
God-power.
Stated differently, White people historically and
contemporaneously have not just claimed the power to name God,102
but have equated themselves to God.103 This tradition of equating
Whiteness with God-ness is perhaps most evident in Protestant and
Catholic iconography, which often portrays Jesus as White.104
B. Interrogating Whiteness as Sacred Identity
The theological construction of White sacred identity begins with
what Kelly Brown Douglas calls the White Anglo-Saxon myth.
Douglas traces the origins of the myth to the United States’ founding,
pointing out that Thomas Jefferson had almost a fanatical obsession
with Anglo-Saxon language, culture, and systems of government.105
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 43 n.89.
Id.
Id. at 43.
Id.
Chris Riotta, Republicans Withdraws Support for Candidate Who Said, ‘God
Is Racist White Supremacist’ and Jewish People Are ‘Satanic’, INDEPENDENT (June

28, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/racistrepublican-russell-walker-god-gop-white-supremacist-antisemitism-jewish-satannorth-carolina-a8421861.html [https://perma.cc/HY4X-VJT4] (noting that in 2018, a
website tied to Russell Walker, a candidate for the North Carolina General
Assembly, stated that “God is a racist white supremacist”).
104. See generally ALEXANDER JUNE ET AL., WHITE JESUS: THE ARCHITECTURE OF
RACISM IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION (2018) (conceiving of White Jesus as a socially
constructed apparatus — a mythology that animates the architecture of salvation).
The authors argue that White Jesus was constructed by combining empire, colorism,
racism, education, and religion, and distinguish White Jesus from Jesus of the
Gospels, whose life, death, and resurrection mandates a love ethic. Id.
105. DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 11 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the
Honorable J. Evelyn Denison, M.P., in AMERICAN HISTORY FROM REVOLUTION TO
RECONSTRUCTION
AND
BEYOND
(Nov.
9,
1825),
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Jefferson believed that Americans were “chosen by God to
implement Anglo-Saxon system of governing.”106 Douglas writes that
Jefferson, and later Benjamin Franklin, applied religious narratives
about Anglo-Saxonism in a sectarian way that was not necessarily
Christian.107 Their new ideology was about “the sacred nature of
Anglo-Saxonism” and eventually became American civil religion.108
Jefferson and Franklin’s secularized philosophy ultimately generated
a myth of racial superiority that both determined America’s founding
and defined its identity. The myth “constructed cherished property
and generated a culture to shelter that property, thus insuring that
America remain ‘exceptional.’”109 Anglo-Saxonism became not only
an identity marker, but the very core of what it meant to be an
American, which was to be governed by White people, whose
governmental institutions were considered superior.
In 1775, the focus on preserving Anglo-Saxon governmental
institutions shifted to a focus on the racial purity of the nation’s
inhabitants.110 Franklin, for example, began to emphasize protecting
“the language, customs, and complexion of ‘pure [W]hite people.’”111
Soon after, two pivotal cultural events solidified the relationship
between Anglo-Saxonism and White sacred identity: (1) the
Romantic Movement, which highlighted the differences between
peoples and resulted in the almost complete identification between
God and humans;112 and (2) the quest for human origins in the
nineteenth century, which helped construct a myth of “a specific,
gifted people — the Indo-Europeans.”113
Douglas explains that U.S. courts reinforced the notion that AngloSaxon identity was special and distinct. In United States v. Bhagat
Singh Thind, Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian immigrant, petitioned for
naturalized citizenship, contending that he was the descendant of a

http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomasjefferson/jefl283.php [https://perma.cc/LL27-LR3M]).
106. Id. at 12.
107. Id. at 13.
108. Id. (citing ROBERT BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL
RELIGION IN TIME OF TRIAL (1992)).
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 17.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 18–20.
113. Id. at 20 (citing REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM 33 (1981)).

172

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

high-caste Hindu, which meant he was Aryan and therefore White.114
The majority denied Thind’s claim, stating, “[t]he children of English,
French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other Europe parentage,
quickly merge into the mass of our population and lose the distinctive
hallmarks of their European origin.”115 Of Thind, the Court
remarked, “[o]n the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the
children born in this country of Hindu parents would retain
indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry.”116
In essence, the Court denied Thind’s citizenship because Thind did
not appear to be White and could not assimilate to Whiteness. The
case marked a seismic shift in American conceptions of the White
body, Douglas explains, because Anglo-Saxon blood proved that it
was able to “stand its ground against the threat of contamination . . .
[and] had the power to extinguish [other] identities.”117 Thind laid
the legal groundwork for the White body as exceptional and,
therefore, sacred.118 Douglas explains that White bodies, which she
describes as “castles,”119 carry this sacredness with them wherever
they go.120 She maintains that, in its strongest form, the Anglo-Saxon
myth was codified in the form of twenty-first century Stand Your
Ground Laws,121 which are established to protect White sacred

114. United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); DOUGLAS, supra
note 28, at 38 (citing Thind, 261 U.S. at 206).
115. DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 38–39 (citing Thind, 261 U.S. at 215).
116. Id. at 39 (citing Thind, 261 U.S. at 215).
117. Id. at 39.
118. Yazmine C’Bona Levonna Nichols, Charged with Impiety, When Black
RELIGION
DISPATCHES
(Oct.
6,
2016),
Bodies
Defy
Tradition,
http://religiondispatches.org/charged-with-impiety-when-black-bodies-defy-tradition/
[https://perma.cc/3XAA-GDG5].
119. DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 115 (explaining that Stand Your Ground laws
“extended the ‘castle doctrine’ to include defense of one’s space as well as one’s
home. The castle doctrine was now applied to public space. It, in effect, allowed for
the protection of white space, which is whatever space white bodies inhabit. The
white body becomes essentially a mobile castle.”).
120. Id. at 42.
121. Id. Stand Your Ground laws allow a person to use deadly force in self-defense in
public, even if that force can be safely avoided by retreating. Stand Your Ground Laws,
GIFFORDS
L.
CTR.,
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-inpublic/stand-your-ground-laws/ [https://perma.cc/PB3U-66KB] (last visited Nov. 1,
2019). These laws “upended centuries of legal tradition, emboldening individuals to
use deadly force even when a safe retreat from the situation is possible or when
nonlethal force would suffice.” Id.; see also Stand Your Ground and Castle Doctrine
Laws,
BILL
RTS.
INST.,
https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educatorresources/lessons-plans/current-events/stand-your-ground/ [https://perma.cc/4WKEVB5Q] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) (explaining that Florida’s Stand Your Ground law
allows those who feel a reasonable threat of death or bodily injury to “meet force
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identity and White property. Taking Douglas’s theory to its natural
conclusion, all public and private space becomes part of the White
sacred identity.122
Given the history discussed above, White supremacy and antiBlackness must be understood as psycho-spiritual and structural evils
that work in tandem. Thus, it is imperative that those who are
invested in undoing the harms of Whiteness recognize it not just as a
legally constructed category, but also as theologically constructed.
The belief that White bodies are sacred implies the inverse: that
Black bodies are dirty and need to be quarantined, killed, and/or
controlled. Harris writes, “[i]n the commonly held popular view, the
presence of Black ‘blood’ . . . evoked the ‘metaphor . . . of purity and
contamination’ in which Black blood is a contaminant and White
racial identity is pure.”123 When contextualized against this backdrop,
it becomes apparent that White-on-Black FRBPCs occur in part
because a “free [B]lack body . . . threatens the very social order,”124
by disrupting it.
The next Part of the Note examines why current New York State
law is an inadequate remedy for this existing psycho-spiritual and
structural crisis.
IV. THE INEFFICACY OF CURRENT NEW YORK STATE FALSE
REPORTING STATUTES AND HATE CRIME STATUTES
Section II.A of this Part identifies the individual and collective
legal harm that Black people suffer as a result of FRBPCs. Section
II.B discusses the inefficacy of New York State false reporting
statutes. Lastly, Section II.C discusses the inefficacy of New York
State Hate Crime statutes.
A. The Legal Harm or Injury
The adaptability125 of anti-Blackness and White supremacy make
them difficult to eradicate. These ideologies are even more difficult
to tackle when they occur in the form of White-on-Black FRBPCs,

with force” rather than retreat). Similar “Castle Doctrine” laws assert that a person
does not need to retreat if their home is attacked. Id. Over half of the states in the
United States have forms of “Stand Your Ground” or “Castle Laws” laws on their
books. Id.
122. Nichols, supra note 118.
123. Harris, supra note 46, at 1737 (citing Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our
Constitution Is Colorblind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1991)).
124. DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 69.
125. Supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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because the law bifurcates potential redresses. On the one hand, false
reporting statutes exist to deter people from making illegitimate
claims and wasting valuable state resources. On the other hand, hate
crime statutes exist to discourage people from committing prejudicemotivated crimes and to protect potential victims. In the first
instance, the broad legal harm is the misuse of public resources and,
in the second, the legal harm is discrimination or racial animus
directed toward the victim.
Black victims of White-on-Black
FRBPCs, however, experience a compounded injury, including but
not limited to public embarrassment,126 psychological harm,127 racial
stigma,128 and in some cases, arrest or imprisonment. This injury is
imported not only to the individual Black victim, but also results in a
group-based injury to Black people as a whole.129

126. See Samuel Brenner, ‘Negro Blood In His Veins’: The Development and
Disappearance of the Doctrine of Defamation Per Se by Racial Misidentification in
the American South, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333, 334–35 (2010) (discussing
defamation per se by racial misidentification, which was historically recognized as a

morally egregious tort).
Between the first years after the ratification of the United States
Constitution and the middle of the twentieth century, to the state courts in
the American South and West (and in at least one state in the North)
repeatedly found defendants in tort actions liable for having uttered per se
defamatory (either slanderous or libelous) statements by falsely or
mistakenly identifying individuals as ‘Mulattos,’ ‘Colored,’ ‘Negros,’ or
‘Niggers.’
Id.
127. See Physiological & Psychological Impact of Racism and Discrimination for
African-Americans,
AM.
PSYCHOL.
ASS’N
(2019),
https://www.apa.org/pi/oema/resources/ethnicity-health/racism-stress
[https://perma.cc/6Y3F-ME4Q] (“[U]nique psycho-social and contextual factors,
specifically the common and pervasive exposure to racism and discrimination, creates
an additional daily stressor for African-Americans.”).
128. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (citing Belton v. Gebhart,
87 A.2d 862, 865 (Del. Ch. 1952)) (noting that segregation of White and Colored
children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the Colored children).
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the
negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard]
the educational and mental development of negro children and to
deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly]
integrated school system.

Id.

129. Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox:
Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673,

698 (1993) (stating that, in regard to hate crimes, “the victim suffers for being singled
out on the basis of her race, and the general community of the target racial group is
harmed as well”).
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FRBPCs are particularly dangerous for Black people because they
are rooted in private acts of force that are given legitimacy by law
when White citizens enlist the police to enforce racial boundaries.
This boundary enforcement relegates Black individuals to
geographical confinement and, in some cases, literal incarceration.130
Neither the existing New York State false reporting statute nor the
New York State hate crime statute addresses the intersection between
false reporting and racially motivated crimes. The following Sections
will discuss the inefficacy of current New York State law.
B. New York State False Reporting Statute
In New York, “false reporting” is a third degree misdemeanor
offense.131 The New York Penal Law states:
A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the third degree
when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to
be false or baseless, he or she: Gratuitously reports to a law
enforcement officer or agency (a) the alleged occurrence of an
offense or incident which did not in fact occur; or (b) an allegedly
impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not
about to occur; or (c) false information relating to an actual offense
or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein.132

In Daas v. Pearson, a New York State Supreme Court denied a
defendant’s motion to dismiss a false reporting claim, reasoning that
130. See Ray Sanchez & Steve Almasy, Spike Lee Explains Expletive-Filled
Gentrification Rant, CNN (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/26/us/newyork-spike-lee-gentrification/index.html [https://perma.cc/H79G-94J2]; see also
Daniel Kay Hertz, How Segregated Is New York City?, DANIELKAYHERTZ.COM
(April 14, 2014), https://danielkayhertz.com/2014/04/14/how-segregated-is-new-yorkcity/ [https://perma.cc/GYG9-LATM]; Yazmine C’Bona Levonna Nichols, Opinion,

The Harmful Effects of Gentrification on NYC’s Low-Income Black and Latino
Populations, BLAVITY (Nov. 14, 2018), https://blavity.com/the-harmful-effects-of-

gentrification-on-nycs-low-income-black-and-latino-populations?category1=opinion
[https://perma.cc/PV76-Q5BE].
131. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50(3) (McKinney 2009) (stating that under New York
State law, falsely reporting an incident in third degree is a Class A misdemeanor); see
also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 1967) (stating that sentences of
imprisonment for a Class A misdemeanor “shall be fixed by the court, and shall not
exceed three hundred sixty-four days”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.55 (McKinney 2001)
(stating that falsely reporting an incident in the second degree is a Class E felony);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.60 (McKinney 2001) (stating that falsely reporting an incident
in the first degree is a Class D felony); Section 70.15, Sentences of Imprisonment for
N.Y.
ST.
SENATE,
Misdemeanors
and
Violation,
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/PEN/70.15 [https://perma.cc/Q46S-K7PY]
(last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (describing the sentences of imprisonment associated with
each class of criminal misdemeanors).
132. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50(3)(a)-(c) (McKinney 2009).
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“[w]hile the violation of this statute may not be negligence per se, the
statute does establish a standard of reasonableness of care and
conduct.”133 The court went on to opine that “[w]ords constitute an
act and words negligently or falsely and wrongfully uttered may be
actionable under certain circumstances.”134
The Pearson case
reinforces the notion that false reporting has harms beyond the
economic consequences of expending unnecessary police resources.
In People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, the New York State Supreme
Court clarified that the legislature intended for the word
“gratuitously” in the statute to make the giving of false information a
crime only where that information was volunteered and unsolicited.135
The Morris case establishes that part of the reason why perpetrators
incur liability is because they falsely call the police of their own
volition.
This Note defines a frivolous race-based call as calling the police on
an individual because of that individual’s real or perceived racial
identity, when said individual is engaged in quotidian activities
(everyday tasks such as sleeping, walking, and playing in the park)
that under most circumstances, would not be considered criminal.
Some White-on-Black frivolous race-based police calls do, in fact,
satisfy the criminal elements under the traditional New York false
reporting statute. In a case like the Starbucks incident — where a
White manager called the police because Donte Robinson and
Rashon Nelson did not immediately purchase items while inside the
store136 — a private White citizen makes a call, knowing that the
information is either false or baseless. The White individual making
the call usually gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or

133. Daas v. Pearson, 66 Misc.2d 95, 98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings Cty. 1971) (citing
Beauchamp v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 190 N.E.2d 412 (N.Y. 1963); Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch Tr. Co., 200 N.E. 824, 828–29 (N.Y. 1936); superseded by
statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R § 214-c (McKinney 2003), as recognized in Caronia v. Phillip
Morris USA, 5 N.E.3d 11 (N.Y. 2013); Major v. Waverly & Ogden, 8 A.D.2d 380
(N.Y. App. Div., 2d Dep’t 1959)).
134. Id. (citing Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARV. L.
REV. 184, 189 (1900)).
135. People ex rel. Morris v. Skinner, 67 Misc.2d 221, 222-23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Monroe Cty. 1971); see also People v. Oliver, 193 Misc.2d 250, 251-52 (N.Y. City Ct.
2002) (“The presence of the investigators resulted from contact initiated by the
defendant’s mother, an action set in motion by the defendant’s claim. Thus . . . the
defendant started a chain of events resulting in police questioning and therefore was
responsible for initiating police contact. Under these circumstances the initial
statements by the defendant were made gratuitously and were not the product of
solicitation by law enforcement.”).
136. Miller, supra note 1.
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agency — meaning they give the information voluntarily and
unsolicited. And he or she usually satisfies one or all of the criteria
listed in § 240.50(3)(a)–(c). In the Oakland barbequing incident, for
example, Jennifer Schulte alleged the occurrence of an offense or
incident which did not, in fact, occur. She claimed that the Black
family could not barbecue because using charcoal was illegal in the
area.137
In other cases, White citizens allege the impending
occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to
occur.138 And in still other instances, White citizens may falsify or
exaggerate information relating to an actual offense or incident.139
But there is a wide array of other incidents that do not fall within
the statutory definition of a false report. In one case, two workers
called the police on Jermaine Massey, a Black man who was a guest at
the DoubleTree Hotel in Portland, Oregon.140 At the time that the
employees made the call, they did not necessarily know the
information to be false, as required by the false reporting statute.
The employees likely assumed that, because Massey was Black, he
was not a hotel guest. Therefore, they wrongfully inferred that he
was breaking the law by trespassing. Similarly, the White student
who called the police on Lolade Siyonbola, a Black Yale student who
was sleeping in a university common room,141 likely subscribed to the
same line of thinking and would not meet the requirement for
“knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false

137. Zhao, supra note 2.
138. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Tom Steele, Woman Who Lied about Being Abducted, Raped by
Black Men Pleads Guilty to Faking Evidence, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/courts/2018/02/24/woman-who-lied-about-beingabducted-raped-by-black-men-pleads-guilty-to-faking-evidence/
[https://perma.cc/P24J-GGJS] (stating that Breana Harmon, a White woman, lied to
police when she said she had been kidnapped and raped by several Black men.
Harmon later confessed that she had been fighting with her fiancé and did not think
their relationship would last much longer. She said she started cutting her clothes and
herself, then made up the abduction); see also Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Race and
Punishment: Racial Perceptions of Crime and Support for Punitive Policies, SENT’G
PROJECT (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/race-andpunishment-racial-perceptions-of-crime-and-support-for-punitivepolicies/#B.%20The%20Racial%20Gap%20in%20Punitiveness (“When asked for
numerical estimates of crime rates, whites attribute an exaggerated amount to people
of color. And when asked to what degree various racial groups are ‘prone to
violence,’ whites rank people of color as more violence-prone than their own race.”);
Russell-Brown, As Racial Hoaxes Go, supra note 19 (“White accusers are more
likely to say they were victims of a random act of violence by a make-believe black
offender.”).
140. Youn, supra note 6.
141. Griggs, supra note 5.
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or baseless.”142 The White woman who called the police on the Black
mother and her eight-year-old daughter who were selling water
without a permit143 could likely circumvent the false reporting statute
by arguing that her police call was neither a “false” nor “baseless”
claim. Although these incidents do not fall within the statutory
definition of a false report, they should be understood within the
FRBPC framework because they involve White individuals
attempting to criminalize Black people’s presence in effectively White
spaces. All the Black victims were engaged in quotidian activities
that, under usual circumstances, would, and should not, be considered
criminal. In other words, they were policed simply for being Black.
In addition to the various inadequacies that have been identified,
there is another defect within the New York State false reporting
system: lack of data collection and selective enforcement.144
Currently, there is no comprehensive database that documents the
number and frequency of frivolous race-based police calls or false
reports. Although the New York City police department compiles
yearly “Crime and Enforcement Activity Reports” that contain
information on crime victims’ race and ethnicity,145 information on
White-on-Black FRBPCs is virtually non-existent. This is in part
because police officers can use their discretion about whether or not
to document each incident,146 and because they are less likely to
believe a Black person who accuses a White person of committing a

142. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50 (McKinney 2009).
143. St. Felix, supra note 3.
144. “White residents were more likely than Black, Hispanic, and residents of
other races to initiate contact with police – for example to report a crime, a non-crime
emergency, or to seek help for another reason.” Alexi Jones, Police Stops Are Still
Marred by Racial Discrimination, New Data Shows, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct.
12,
2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/10/12/policing/
[https://perma.cc/94RB-2W9Y]; see also RUSSELL-BROWN, THE COLOR OF CRIME,
supra note 11; Hernandez, supra note 33, at 846 (stating that “bias incidents more
often than not elude prosecution”) (citing Interview with John Fried, Chief of Trial
Division within New York County District Attorney’s Office (July 20, 1989);
Telephone Interview with Police Officer Walls, N.Y.C. Bias Unit (July 20, 1989)
(most incidents are deemed prosecution-worthy cases by the police because in their
experience, disfavored group community members do not make frivolous claims
about such attacks)); Russell-Brown, As Racial Hoaxes Go, supra note 19.
145. See generally Crime and Enforcement Activity Reports, N.Y.C. POLICE
DEP’T,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/stats/reports-analysis/crime-enf.page
[https://perma.cc/TR4E-3KU2] (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
146. See Tom Tyler, Police Discretion in the 21st Century Surveillance State, 2016
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 579, 585 (2016) (“While past discussions focus on police discretion
concerning whether to cite or arrest people, officers have equally broad discretion
concerning how they treat the members of the public with whom they deal, i.e.
whether they are respectful, whether they explain their decisions.”).
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bias crime.147 This problem of selective enforcement and underdocumentation likely arises for two reasons: (1) the officer may have
a shared perception with the White caller and therefore elect to
remove the Black person from the space; or (2) the officer may
diffuse the situation altogether, eliminating the need to log the
incident as a false report or frivolous call. As it is currently written,
the New York false reporting statute does not effectively curb FRBCs
because it contains glaring gaps that do not account for raciallymotivated police calls.
C. New York State Hate Crime Statute
New York State law provides that a person commits a hate crime
when he or she commits a specified offense and either:
(a) intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is
committed or intended to be committed in whole or in substantial
part because of a belief or perception regarding the race, color,
national origin, ancestry, gender, gender identity or expression,
religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a
person, regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct, or
(b) intentionally commits the act or acts constituting the offense in
whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception
regarding [the stated characteristics].148

Although the hate crime statute ostensibly covers a broad range of
prejudicially-motivated crimes, it is not particularly helpful for Black
victims of frivolous race-based police calls, whose false reporting
claims fall outside the statute’s scope. In the case of FRBPCs, the
White citizen’s act is both an individual offense to the Black person
whose quotidian behavior is rendered criminal and a collective
offense to the Black community at large because it engenders fear,
and utilizes valuable state resources to regulate Black bodies.
Similar to the false reporting context, the hate crime statute and its
accompanying systems of collection are void of meaningful data and
subject to the problem of selective enforcement.149 The New York

147. Katheryn Russell-Brown, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as
Affirmation, 71 IND. L.J. 593, 616 (1996) [hereinafter Russell-Brown, The Racial
Hoax as Crime] (citing Laure Weber Brooks, Police Discretionary Behavior: A Study
of Style, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING 140, 154–55 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey

P. Alpert eds., 2d ed. 1993)) (“The police are not likely to treat as seriously the claim
of victimization of someone Black as they would a similar claim by someone
White.”).
148. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(1)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2018).
149. Hernandez, supra note 33, at 848.

180

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) is an agency that is
statutorily required to produce statistical reports,150 and each year, it
produces a report entitled, Hate Crime Incidents in New York State
by Reporting Agency.151 The report documents the number of hate
crimes reported by each agency by county, but does not specify the
type of hate crime committed.152 The agency also publishes the Hate
Crime in New York State Annual Report, which details hate crime
incidents that law enforcement agencies report to DCJS, including
data on the number of incidents and type of bias reported. 153 The
latter report breaks down the reported crimes into two categories: (1)
Crimes Against Persons (defined as rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
simple assault); and (2) Property Crimes (defined as burglary,
larceny, arson, criminal mischief).154 Race-based false reports are not
included in either category of hate crimes. This is problematic
because it leaves a gap in the law.
The reason that New York State hate crime law fails to address
race-based false reports is because FRBPCs involve elements of false
reporting crimes and hate crimes, placing the calls outside of
traditional legal analysis.
The traditional anti-discrimination
framework unfortunately focuses “on the most privileged group
members [and] marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened.”155
This anti-discrimination framework marginalizes those Black people
whose claims do not fall within strictly defined legal categories. New
York State hate crime law thus fails to acknowledge the

150. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 837(4)(c) (McKinney 2017); see also Criminal Justice
N.Y.S.
DIVISION
CRIM.
JUST.
SERVS.,
Statistics,

https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/stats.htm
[https://perma.cc/U6BXMU6K] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
151. N.Y.S. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., HATE CRIME INCIDENTS IN NEW
YORK
STATE
BY
REPORTING
AGENCY
(2017),
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/hatecrimeincidents2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T46L-LHQB].
152. Id.
153. BRIAN DENVIR, HATE CRIME IN NEW YORK STATE 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1
(2017),
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/hate-crime-in-nys-2016annual-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RN7-E3W8].
154. Id. at 2.
155. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, De-Marginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:

A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 138, 140 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw,
De-Marginalizing] (contrasting Black womens’ experience with dominant

conceptions of discrimination, and arguing that “in race discrimination cases,
discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex-or class-privileged Blacks; in sex
discrimination cases, the focus is on race- and class-privileged women”).
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intersectional156 nature of FRBPCs, which are premised on
compound assumptions about race, class, and gender.
Both hate crime and false reporting statutes are ineffective because
they fail to address discrimination as an adaptive and malleable
problem.157 Law professor Elise Boddie explains that, in the realm of
constitutional law, the federal courts virtually “read racial geography
out of Equal Protection framework.” 158 Courts almost never
consider the meaning and import of racial geography in a claim of
racial discrimination, instead focusing on the race of the parties and
the state’s use of explicit racial classifications.159 Under Boddie’s
proposed framework, courts would examine the meaning of a
particular space and the marginalization of people of color.160 Just as
in the constitutional law context, the New York State statutory
framework, and state court interpretations of that framework, tend to
focus “singularly on individuals and neglect spatial context.”161 Thus,
existing New York State law misses an important element of racial
harm.162 The current New York State false reporting and hate crime
statutes, in failing to address the connection between false reporting
and racially-motivated hate crimes, fuel the creation of vast
geographical prisons, which effectively trap Black people in
manufactured ghettos and render them immobile. Even political
leaders, like Jesse Hamilton, become prisoners in their own
campaigning territory.163
These geographical prisons have
psychological implications, too164 — Black children who merely want
to swim at their neighborhood pool must proceed with caution, lest

156. Id. at 149 (comparing the compounding forms of discrimination that Black
women face to an intersection, where traffic flows in all four directions). “If an
accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any
number of directions, and sometimes by all of them. Similarly, if a Black woman is
harmed at the intersection, her injury could result from sex discrimination or race
discrimination.” Id.
157. See generally Boddie, supra note 42.
158. Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 421 (2010)
[hereinafter Boddie, Racial Territoriality].
159. Id. at 408.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 410.
162. Id.
163. See Mosbergen, supra note 8.
164. See JAMES H. CONE, SPEAKING THE TRUTH: ECUMENISM, LIBERATION AND
BLACK THEOLOGY 67 (1986) (“When I say that injustice is violence, I mean that the
slum environment, the structure of the slum itself, works violence against those who
live within it, even if they never experience the physical harm so often attendant on
slum dwelling.” (quoting ROBERT M. BROWN, RELIGION AND VIOLENCE 35–36
(1973)).
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they be arrested and placed in actual confinement.165 Cumulatively,
these incidents subject Black people to violent exclusion and relegate
Blacks to the slums and the shadows.
V. A NEW, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
Section V.A of this Part briefly discusses Senator Jesse Hamilton’s
proposal for a New York State hate crime bill and why its focus on
intentional discrimination is misplaced. Section V.B discusses why a
meaningful remedy must address the psycho-spiritual and structural
aspects of the FRBPC problem by incorporating theological
discourse, tort law and criminal law principles, and critical legal
theory. In addition, Section V.C discusses a proposed alternative
remedy, and Section V.D discusses the role of enforcing agencies.
A. Senator Hamilton’s Hate Crime Bill
After a White woman called the police on New York State Senator
Jesse Hamilton,166 the lawmaker proposed a bill that would make
calling the police on a Black person a hate crime. Hamilton
remarked:
These 911 calls are more than frivolous. These 911 calls amount to
more than just a waste of police time and resources. These 911 calls
are acts of intimidation . . . . Living while [B]lack is not a crime. But
making a false report, especially motivated by hate, should be. Our
laws should recognize that false reports with hateful intent can have
deadly consequences.167

While Hamilton’s proposed legislation is a step toward muchneeded reform, its focus on intentional acts of discrimination will
make it, and other similar solutions,168 subject to the same pitfalls of
traditional anti-discrimination law. Rather than relying strictly on

165. See McBride, supra note 4.
166. Mosbergen, supra note 8.
167. Id.; see also Press Release, Jesse Hamilton, Senator, New York State Senate,
Senator Jesse Hamilton Announces 911 Anti-Discrimination, Anti-Harassment
Legislation in Wake of Living While Black Incidents in Brooklyn and across the
Country (Aug. 15, 2018), www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/jessehamilton/senator-jesse-hamilton-announces-911-anti-discrimination-anti
[https://perma.cc/2QTP-9NNH].
168. See Jaweed Kaleem, #LivingWhileBlack: New Laws Could Outlaw Racially
Motivated 911 Calls, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/nation/lana-living-while-black-police-20190527-story.html
[https://perma.cc/Z43Q-BWXV]
(noting that, in some states like Michigan, proposed laws would make it a “criminal
misdemeanor to racially profile people of color for participating in their lives” and
subject people behind those 911 calls to a $500 fine).
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preexisting legal structures, this Note proposes that the law has
signaling power apart from its actual enforcement169 and that
remedies should be aimed at fixing the core problem — White
supremacy and anti-Blackness, which are both psycho-spiritual and
structural evils.
B. Insights: Theology, Tort Law, Criminal Law, and Critical Legal
Theory
Frivolous race-based police calls are quasi-criminal torts that arise
out of the unspoken social contract between individuals. This Note
proposes a meaningful legal remedy that addresses the psychospiritual component of the FRBPC problem by incorporating
theological discourse. The legal remedy also addresses the structural
component of the problem, drawing on tort law and criminal law
principles, and incorporating aspects of critical legal theory. The
proposed legal remedy emphasizes tort law principles that aim to
correct social wrongs, restore the moral balance between persons,
“make the victim whole,” and impose civil liability on wrongdoers.
The proposed remedy also emphasizes criminal law’s commitment to
holding wrongdoers accountable for their actions using alternative
community-centered sanctions.
Although this Note relies on some core principles of civil law and
criminal law, it recognizes that there are barriers to entry for potential
Black plaintiffs, which suggest that a meaningful remedy should not
be limited to the court system. If the goal is not simply to punish
White defendants, but to eradicate or reduce White supremacy and
anti-Blackness, then an effective legal remedy must take into account
the various benefits and costs of litigation, which differ depending on
the Black victim’s class and gender. It is here that critical legal theory
becomes indispensable.
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality170 cautions that
the single-axis framework bifurcates victims’ experiences and renders

169. See Garcia-Villegas, supra note 29, at 133 (“A good aspirational
constitutionalism is one that narrows the gap between desires and realities and, in this
way, ends up being a strong constitutionalism of protection, or in other words, a
constitutionalism which aims to guarantee rights in the present.”).
170. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration:
Thinking Intersectionally about Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1418, 1427 (2012) (“[T]here are many ways that surveillance and punishment are
intersectionally scripted, including the ways in which race, gender, or class hierarchies
structure the backdrop against which punitive policies interact.”).
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Black women and poor Black people invisible.171 Crenshaw’s
contribution compels us to consider multiple factors. Civil law, for
example, does not guarantee a right to counsel for either defendants
or plaintiffs;172 the financial and time cost of going through a civil trial
might deter Black victims from bringing valid claims. In addition to
the aforementioned considerations, a meaningful legal remedy must
seek to avoid the pitfalls of the “intent” doctrine,173 which misses
important elements of racial harm,174 and must address implicit and
explicit forms of racial bias that result in selective enforcement.175
Finally, the legal remedy must be aspirational.176 This means
acknowledging that the law can serve public education purposes
beyond enforcement.
C. The Remedy
This Note’s remedy includes some of the elements required by
New York State false reporting statutes and hate crime statutes,
focusing on gratuitous calls that are made voluntarily and/or are

171. Crenshaw, De-Marginalizing, supra note 155, at 140 (arguing that, “in race
discrimination cases, discrimination tends to be viewed in terms of sex or classprivileged Blacks; in sex discrimination cases, the focus is on race and class-privileged
women”); see also generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1241 (1991).
172. See Status Map, NAT’L COALITION FOR A CIV. RIGHT TO COUNS.,
http://civilrighttocounsel.org/map [https://perma.cc/D6XY-S2NS] (last visited Nov.
19, 2019) (indicating that a civil right to a lawyer does exist for certain matters in
particular municipalities; New York City, San Francisco, and Newark, New Jersey
have a right to counsel for tenants facing eviction).
173. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987)(“Traditional
notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are
influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional —
in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought — nor unintentional —
in the sense that the outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the
decisionmaker’s beliefs, desires, and wishes.” (citations omitted)).
174. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, supra note 158, at 410.
175. Hernandez, supra note 33, at 850.
There are three possible explanations for this lack of enforcement: the
exclusion of disfavored groups other than Black Americans from statutory
protection; unmonitored prosecutorial discretion; and the related problem
of unconscious prosecutorial racism. Unmonitored discretion, coupled with
unconscious racism and lack of explicit inclusion of other disfavored groups
in the statute, allows prosecutors to: ignore bias crimes; not consider them
serious enough for full enforcement; or refuse to realize that many discrete
groups are subject to the same bias attacks as are Blacks.
Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 147.
176. See generally Garcia-Villegas, supra note 29.
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unsolicited.
Although the remedy mirrors some criminal law
principles, it primarily relies on civil law concepts of restitution and
wholeness, rather than the criminal law concepts of punishment and
retribution.177 In circumstances where a White-on-Black FRBPC
occurs (when a private White individual calls the police on a Black
person because of that person’s real or perceived racial identity, when
said Black person is engaged in quotidian activities that, under most
circumstances, would not be considered criminal), the law should
impose:
1. A mandatory compensatory penalty or fine that is paid by the
White perpetrator to the Black victim.
2. A mandatory apology requirement.178
3. A mandatory implicit bias and anti-racism training for the White
perpetrator.
4. A mandatory mediation between the White perpetrator and the
Black victim, only upon the Black victim’s request and/or with the
Black victim’s consent.
5. A reporting and data collection requirement that includes: the
location of the frivolous call; the total economic cost of responding
to the call; and the race, sex, and age of the offender and of the
victim.

The first part of the five-pronged solution recommends an
automatic compensatory penalty or fine, which has a long-standing
history within the law. Compensatory damages are often imposed by
courts and government agencies as restitution for wrongdoing within
civil law.179 And New York State criminal law already permits the

177. Contra Russell-Brown, The Racial Hoax as Crime, supra note 147, at 595
(arguing that the criminal law should recognize and punish ongoing racial
discrimination with the goal of bringing balance to the use of the term “race” as it
relates to crime).
178. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and
Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 88–89 (2004).
Remorse and apology could do much more than serve as gauges of an
individual defendant’s need for punishment. Remorse and apology are
fundamentally about social interactions and relationships. Serious
wrongdoers sometimes apologize not only to the direct victim, but also to
everyone who suffered indirect harm, such as members of the victim’s
family and community. Victims, in return, can air their sorrows while
expressing forgiveness to the wrongdoer. Ideally, this interactive process
teaches moral lessons, brings catharsis, and reconciles and heals offenders,
victims, and society.

Id.

179. See generally Vosburg v. Putney, 78 Wis. 84 (1890) (imposing single intent
and strict liability on the defendant – single intent being a minority rule because there
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imposition of fines in false reporting cases that are classified as Class
A misdemeanors.180 In FRBPC cases, a compensatory fine should be
imposed on transgressing White defendants, and the amount of the
fine should be determined by the appropriate adjudicator according
to severity of the incident and as specified by the legislature.181 The
law should consider, for instance, that a Black victim who is detained
or arrested as the result of a FRBPC might be entitled to a larger sum
due to her heightened injury. The purpose of the compensatory
penalty or fine is to “make the [Black] victim whole” and to
compensate her for the injury that she suffers. The penalty or fine
would also serve as a deterrent to future White callers who might
consider making FRBPCs, by signaling to them that the state takes
the offense seriously because of its individual and collective
implications for Black people.182
The second prong of the solution recommends a mandatory
apology and draws on theological principles of repentance.183 It also
rests on existing, though seldom used, norms within the criminal law
system that recognize the power and effectiveness of acts of
contrition.184 Black communities themselves have noted the remedial

is no mens rea requirement). If a defendant intended the harmful act, then the
defendants is liable even if he or she did not intend the harm. Id. If a defendant
intends the harmful act, then he or she is categorically liable, regardless of the mental
element, subjective or objective. Id. Even though the extent of the damage was
unforeseeable, all damages were awarded to the plaintiff. Id.
180. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.05(1) (McKinney 1999) (discussing fines for class A
misdemeanors and violation).
181. Id. § 80.05(4) (“In the case of a violation defined outside this chapter, if the
amount of the fine is expressly specified in the law or ordinance that defines the
offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance with that law or
ordinance.”).
182. Although the proposed remedy raises Equal Protection concerns because it
centers on Black victims, such particularity is justified because the harms differ
between and among racial groups. While Black-on-White FRBPCs do occur, they
occur so infrequently that their inclusion in the proposed law is unnecessary.
Likewise, White-on-White FRBPCs, while they do occur, do not pose the same
societal problems as those where the victim is Black. Both Black-on-White and
White-on-White FRBPCs can be remedied using existing false reporting statutes. See
Russell-Brown, The Racial Hoax as Crime, supra note 147, at 618.
183. 2 Corinthians, supra note 27 (“Godly sorrow brings repentance that leads to
salvation and leaves no regret, but worldly sorrow brings death . . . .”).
184. See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of

Responsibility”: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1507, 1534–40 (1997) (examining

how on-the-ground rules and practices in criminal law treat expressions of remorse
and contrition in administering criminal punishment). O’Hear describes how judges
in most federal district courts tend to award acceptance-of-responsibility discounts to
defendants who plead guilty and deny them to defendants who stand trial. Id.
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power of public apology outside the parameters of the formal legal
system. In one example, after encountering Reverend Dr. James Hal
Cone’s The Cross and the Lynching Tree and uncovering the 1940
lynching of Austin Callaway, a Black community in LaGrange,
Georgia founded “Troup Together,” an organization committed to
investigating the county’s racial history.185 The organization, led by
Bobbie Hart and Wes Edwards, wrote a letter to Police Chief Lou
Dekmar, “describing LaGrange public officials’ complicity in
Callaway’s murder.”186 Dekmar responded by issuing an impassioned
public apology.187 When asked about the impact of the Chief’s
apology, Edwards remarked:
It was a real positive for the community to have the public apology,
to have the [memorial] marker, to have the leadership of the police
department and the city and our religious leaders all acknowledge,
apologize, and confess that this occurred and place the marker at
Warren Temple . . . . It’s now harder to silence that part of our
history.188

Although this Note recognizes that a statutorily-mandated apology
may raise First Amendment concerns,189 it maintains that the
mandatory apology component of the remedy closely aligns with
historical and contemporaneous examples in criminal law cases,
where judges have compelled defendants to issue public apologies
and detail their crimes in court.190 Moreover, the mandatory apology
185. Benjamin Perry, LaGrange and the Lynching Tree, UNION COLLECTIVE: A
MORE PLURAL UNION (May 10, 2019), https://utsnyc.edu/lagrange-and-the-lynchingtree/ [https://perma.cc/MAH8-UVZD].
186. Id.
187. Brad Schrade, In a First, Police Chief to Apologize for 1940 Lynching,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.ajc.com/news/first-georgia-policechief-apologize-for-1940-lynching/feVIgQ6uJ0CMRnqwbdtKvJ/
[https://perma.cc/S6KK-4923].
188. Perry, supra note 185.
189. See W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and
pledge transcended constitutional limitations on their power).
190. See Travis Andersen, Hearing to Resume on BU Rape Case Plea Deal That
Left
Judge
‘Baffled’,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Apr.
9,
2018),
https://www3.bostonglobe.com/metro/2018/04/09/judge-stunned-proposed-plea-dealrape-case/uu0Rn7r3kPYu2tSX7REpXN/story.html?arc404=true
[https://perma.cc/3JFY-2NYL] (“[A] young woman who was allegedly raped in her
Boston University dorm room demanded a public apology from her alleged attacker
[Samson Donick] . . . . ‘There’s an interest in holding people accountable for the
crime, both out of justice for the victim and to prevent future violence, but that
responsibility cannot lie just with the victim.’”); see also Fred Thys, Former MIT
Student Apologizes to Assault Victim for ‘Inexcusable Behavior’, WBUR (Apr. 10,
2018), https://www.wbur.org/edify/2018/04/10/samson-donick-plead-guilty-rape-case
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component of the remedy addresses what some scholars have argued
is criminal law’s minimization of the role of remorse and apology.
“To remedy this neglect, we must focus not just on the individual
defendant’s supposed badness, but also on the social practices and
norms of remorse and apology.”191 An emphasis on repentance,
contrition, and remorse is costly, but lessens the amount of money
spent on other forms of retributive punishment.192 This Note’s
proposed civil remedy can be adapted to fill the gaps left by the
current legal system, and, in this case, is a well-suited remedial
mechanism by which to compel contrition.
The third prong of the solution recommends a mandatory implicit
bias and anti-racism training for the White caller. The legal system
already imposes similar requirements on criminal offenders, ordering
them to participate in community service programs,193 rehabilitative
workshops, dispute resolution,194 and education reform programs.195
The mandatory implicit bias and anti-racism training requirement is
perhaps the most important component of the remedy because it
actually holds the White caller accountable by making her reckon
with her own implicit bias or racism. It has the potential not only to
change her individual behavior, but also to equip her with the tools
necessary to have meaningful conversations with other White people
and to engage in long-term anti-racism work. This Note argues that,
even in the event that the implicit bias and anti-racism trainings were
to have no effect on the White caller, the trainings should be part of
the proposed law because they have an important signaling function

[https://perma.cc/P7BC-USBZ] (granting Donick’s plea bargain, the judge compelled
the defendant to participate in a specific form of public speech: “As a condition of the
plea bargain, [Judge] Sanders made Donick describe in open court what he did to his
victim”).
191. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 178, at 89.
192. Id. at 146–47.
193. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(6) (McKinney 2019) (authorizing the use of
community service as a sanction for certain offenders in conjunction with specific
dispositions imposed by a criminal court); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 353.2(2)(a)(h) (McKinney 2019) (noting that community service sanctions and restitution can
also be imposed by the family court).
194. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(5) (“The court may grant an adjournment in
contemplation of dismissal on condition that the defendant participate in dispute
resolution and comply with any award or settlement resulting therefrom.”).
195. Id. § 170.55(6-a) (“The court may, as a condition of an authorized
adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, where the defendant has been charged
with an offense and the elements of such offense meet the criteria of an ‘eligible
offense’ and such person qualified as an ‘eligible person’ as such terms are defined in
section 458-1 of the social services law, require the defendant to participate in an
education reform program in accordance with section 458-1 of the social services.”).
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apart from their actual effectiveness. Furthermore, the trainings are
consistent with tort law principles of wholeness. That is, they
exemplify a more expansive vision of what it means to make people
whole. In this instance, the trainings not only serve to restore the
individual Black victim by imposing service on the White caller; they
also have the capacity to help restore the Black community’s faith in
the civil system as more than just an economic exchange.
The fourth prong of the solution recommends a mandatory
mediation between the White perpetrator and the Black victim, only
upon the Black victim’s request or with the Black victim’s consent.
Similar to the apology requirement, this component seeks to reduce
or eradicate implicit and explicit acts of White supremacy and antiBlackness by compelling White callers to reckon with the gravity of
their actions. Like apologies, face-to-face mediations can be “a
powerful ritual for offenders, victims, and communities,”196 rituals
that the state could “facilitate by encouraging offenders to interact
face to face with their victims . . . [t]each[ing] offenders lessons,
vindicat[ing] victims, and encourag[ing] communities to welcome
wrongdoers back into the fold.”197 Beyond the societal benefits of
such mediations, Black victims would have a chance to confront the
White caller who harmed them and would have the benefit of being
able to share their story.198 Adjudicators and officials would likely
also benefit from the wealth of information that would be produced
during such a meeting.199
Prong five recommends a reporting and data collection
requirement that includes: the location of the frivolous call; the total
economic cost of responding to the call; and the race, sex, and age of
the offender and of the victim. This component is necessary because,
as discussed in the previous section on the current New York State
false reporting statute, there is no comprehensive database that
documents the number or frequency of frivolous race-based police
calls. Similarly, the New York State hate crime statute and its
accompanying systems of collection are void of meaningful data. The
reporting and data collection component of the remedy will help to
ensure that state and local governments not only track when and

196. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 178, at 90.
197. Id.
198. See Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 611, 611–12 (2009) (arguing that victim impact statements are important
because they provide information to the sentencing judge and help crime victims
recover).
199. Id.
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where the calls are happening but will also lay the groundwork for the
development of analytical tools to protect against such race-based
crimes in the future.
D. The Role of Enforcing Agencies
In absence of an enforcement mechanism, the proposed remedy
would merely be a hollow shell. Indeed, complaining parties and
defendants need a forum whereby their grievances, challenges, and
expectations can be managed. The idea of having an adjudicator
manage disputes between conflicting parties is consonant with
theological principles of justice,200 and is also consonant with the U.S.
legal tradition. To this end, existing state and city agencies can play a
valuable role. In particular, the New York State Division of Human
Rights (DHR) would be a fitting state agency to adjudicate FRBPC
claims. New York State is a pioneer in human rights, and was the first
state in the nation to enact a human rights law, which affords every
citizen “an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life.”201
The state created DHR to enforce its human rights law, and the
agency’s mission is to ensure that “every individual . . . has an equal
opportunity to participate fully in the economic, cultural and
intellectual life of the State.”202 The DHR has the authority to
vigorously prosecute unlawful discriminatory practices; receive,
investigate, and resolve complaints of discrimination; create studies,
programs, and campaigns designed to, among other things, inform
and educate the public on the effects of discrimination and the rights
and obligations under the law; and develop human rights policies and
proposed legislation for the State.203
In addition to the broad authority given to the DHR by statute,
there are specific groups within the agency that are especially
equipped to handle FRBPCs. For example, the Hate Crimes Task

200. See Yairah Amit, Location in Canon and Name, in THE NEW OXFORD
ANNOTATED BIBLE, NEW REVISED STANDARD VERSION WITH THE APOCRYPHA: AN
ECUMENICAL STUDY BIBLE 355 (Michael D. Coogan et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 4th
ed. 2010) (noting that the book of judges features a diverse array of leaders, and that
Deborah and Samuel sat in judgment in the juridical sense). “The Hebrew word
shaphat (‘to judge’) and its derivative shophet (‘a judge’) can mean to ‘adjudicate’
but also to ‘rule’ (2 Chronicles 1:10; Isaiah 51:5) . . . and ‘vindicate, provide justice
for.’ (Psalm 10:18; 82:1-3).” Id.
201. N.Y. HUM. RTS. LAW § 290(3) (2014); Mission Statement, N.Y. ST. DIV. HUM.
RTS., https://dhr.ny.gov/mission-statement [https://perma.cc/C6PS-P6NJ] (last visited
Nov. 3, 2019).
202. N.Y. HUM. RTS. LAW § 290(3).
203. See id. § 295(1)–(11).
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Force created by Governor Cuomo fights the increase in reports of
bias-motivated threats, harassment, and violence.204 The Task Force
is run by the State Division of Human Rights, the State Police, and
the Division of Criminal Justice Services who work together to
prevent, investigate, and monitor hate crimes and violations of human
rights law.205 The Hate Crimes Task Force would be an ideal
adjudicator of FRBPC claims because it has the power to review
complaints and investigate cases with probable cause.206 Given that
complainants can file reports online, Black victims would be
empowered to seek enforcement against frivolous White callers while
avoiding the costs of litigation and traditional barriers to the court
system. The agency would provide an effective factual inquiry and
serve a quasi-prosecutorial function, through a formal hearing or
some other adjudicative proceeding, and could impose a suggested
financial penalty if it determines that a frivolous race-based call has
actually occurred. The agency also produces annual reports, which
would fulfill the reporting and data collection requirement.207
The New York City Commission on Human Rights (CCHR) is a
city agency that can serve as an alternative208 adjudicative body for
FRBPC claims. The CCHR is charged with the enforcement of New
York City Human Rights Law,209 Title 8 of the Administrative Code
of the City of New York,210 and with “educating the public and
encouraging positive community relations.”211 The Commission is

204. About the Task Force, N.Y. STATE HATE CRIMES TASK FORCE,
https://www.ny.gov/programs/hate-crimes-task-force [https://perma.cc/H9PX-YD9J]
(last visited Nov. 3, 2019); see also ANDREW CUOMO, HATE CRIMES TASK FORCE
REPORT 3 (Oct. 24, 2017) [hereinafter HATE CRIMES TASK FORCE REPORT],
https://www.ny.gov/sites/ny.gov/files/atoms/files/Hate_Crime_Task_Force_Report.pd
f [https://perma.cc/3KWJ-ZGMX].
205. About the Task Force, supra note 204.
206. See HATE CRIMES TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 204, at 5.
207. Id. at 9.
208. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-109(f)(ii)–(iii) (McKinney 2018) (noting that a
complainant is not permitted to file the same grievance with the Commission on
Human Rights and the Division of Human Rights).
209. See generally id. § 8-101.
210. Id. (“A city agency is hereby created with power to eliminate and prevent
discrimination from playing any role in actions relating to employment, public
accommodations, and housing and other real estate, and to take other actions against
prejudice, intolerance, bigotry, discrimination, sexual harassment and bias-related
violence or harassment as herein provided; and the commission established
hereunder is hereby given general jurisdiction and power for such purposes.”).
211. Inside the NYC Commission on Human Rights, NYC HUM. RTS. (2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr/about/inside-cchr.page [https://perma.cc/7NJ5-XMN2].
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divided into two major bureaus: Law Enforcement and Community
Relations.
The Law Enforcement Bureau is “responsible for the intake,
investigation, and prosecution of complaints alleging violations of the
Law.”212
The Community Relations Bureau “provides public
education about the Human Rights Law and helps cultivate
understanding and respect among the City’s many diverse
communities through its borough-based Community Service Centers
and numerous educational and outreach programs.”213
The
Commission on Human Rights, much like the Division of Human
Rights, has the power to: hear complaints;214 conduct investigations
and keep records;215 hold hearings;216 issue decisions and orders;217
and impose civil penalties.218 Although the current administrative
212. Id.;
see
also
Enforcement,
NYC
HUM.
RTS.
(2019),
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr/enforcement/enforcement.page
[https://perma.cc/YLZ8-2H62] (describing the role and authority of the Law
Enforcement Bureau).
213. Inside the NYC Commission on Human Rights, supra note 211; see also
NYC
HUM.
RTS.
(2019),
Community,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr/community/community.page [https://perma.cc/GNN7MAZE] (describing the role and work of the Community Relations Bureau).
214. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-109(a) (“Any person aggrieved by an unlawful
discriminatory practice or an act of discriminatory harassment or violence as set forth
in chapter 6 of this title, or such person’s attorney, may make, sign and file with the
commission a verified complaint in writing which shall: (i) state the name of the
person alleged to have committed the unlawful discriminatory practice or act of
discriminatory harassment or violence complained of, and the address of such person
if known; (ii) set forth the particulars of the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice
or act of discriminatory harassment or violence; and (iii) contain such other
information as may be required by the commission. The commission shall
acknowledge the filing of the complaint and advise the complainant of the time limits
set forth in this chapter.”).
215. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-114.
216. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-119(a) (“A hearing on the complaint shall be
held before an administrative law judge designated by the commission. The place of
any such hearing shall be the office of the commission or such other place as may be
designated by the commission. Notice of the date, time and place of such hearing
shall be served upon the complainant, respondent and any necessary party.”).
217. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-120.
218. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-126(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in
subdivision 13 of § 8-107, in addition to any of the remedies and penalties set forth in
subdivision a of § 8-120, where the commission finds that a person has engaged in an
unlawful discriminatory practice, the commission may, to vindicate the public
interest, impose a civil penalty of not more than $125,000. Where the commission
finds that an unlawful discriminatory practice was the result of the respondent’s
willful, wanton or malicious act or where the commission finds that an act of
discriminatory harassment or violence as set forth in chapter 6 of this title has
occurred, the commission may, to vindicate the public interest, impose a civil penalty
of not more than $250,000.”).
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code states that “[a]ny civil penalties recovered . . . shall be paid into
the general fund of the city,”219 the proposed law should permit
FRBPC victims themselves to receive appropriate compensatory
damages.
Both the Division of Human Rights and the City Commission on
Human Rights are ideal adjudicative bodies because they have the
power to ensure just outcomes through state and local government.
The agencies could and should look to examples from private actors
like Starbucks, which addressed the 2018 FRBPC incident that
occurred at one of its Philadelphia shops by implementing a multifaceted approach. The franchise’s response included: reaching an
undisclosed settlement with the Black victims Rashon Nelson and
Dante Robinson; offering to pay the two men’s college tuition;
sending its CEO to issue an in-person apology; and mandating the
closing of 8000 Starbucks stores in the U.S. on May 29, 2018 so that
some 175,000 employees could get training in unconscious bias.220
The agencies could and should also look to the City of Philadelphia’s
response to the Starbucks incident. To make amends for the
unwarranted arrests, the City reached a symbolic $1 settlement with
Nelson and Robinson, agreed to expunge their arrest records, and
pledged to contribute $200,000 to create a counseling and mentoring
program for Philadelphia high school students.221 The Starbucks
example provides a model for what an enforceable legal remedy
could look like, if such a remedy were adopted and applied to hold
White individuals accountable for the harms of frivolous race-based
police calls.
CONCLUSION
The interdisciplinary legal remedy outlined above problematizes
frivolous race-based police calls as privatized, extralegal acts of
discrimination and addresses the individual and group-based injury
that Black people experience. The five-pronged solution has the
potential to eradicate or reduce the imprisoning remnants of White
supremacy and anti-Blackness by recognizing the need for psycho-

219. N.Y.C. ADMIN CODE § 8-127(a).
220. Errin Haines Whack, Black Men Arrested at Starbucks Settle with the
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(May
2,
2018),
Company,
https://www.apnews.com/774de094bff34421af4cb250a20475dc
[https://perma.cc/V6B6-ZNQV].
221. Id.
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spiritual “repentance”222 and structural change within the law. It

embodies the heart of tort law principles by requiring White
perpetrators to make Black victims whole and embodies the heart of
criminal law principles by authorizing the use of community-centered
sanctions for FRBPC offenses.
Lastly, the proposed solution
incorporates intersectional analysis and valid concerns raised by
critical legal theorists. The proposed remedy affirms Black people’s
humanity and their divinity by divesting White people of “their
subjugating control over non[W]hite bodies.”223 In the event that
such a law is not frequently enforced, its aspirational nature still
suffices as a source of empowerment for Black people, and affirms
their inherent value.

222. 2 Corinthians, supra note 27 (“Godly sorrow brings repentance that leads to
salvation and leaves no regret, but worldly sorrow brings death . . . .”).
223. See DOUGLAS, supra note 28, at 69 and accompanying text.

